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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DISABILITY
COMPENSATION POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL
ILLNESSES AND INJURIES
Mark Brown, Ph.D.∗
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has responded
to the healthcare and disability compensation needs of veterans of
the Vietnam War for more than three decades. Ongoing concerns
by veterans, their families, Congress and others have made longterm health effects from exposure to Agent Orange and other
herbicides used in the Vietnam War a major focus of the VA’s
response.
Part I of this article will provide an overview of the VA’s
mandate with respect to the provision of federal benefits to
veterans and their families. This section also will discuss the
requirements that veterans applying for such benefits must meet
and the difficulties veterans face when their claims are based on
latent illnesses arising from hazardous exposures that occurred
years before. Part II will describe the VA’s approach to disability
compensation for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange as
well as the VA’s more recent attempts to duplicate that approach
∗
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for veterans from other combat missions, including the 1991 Gulf
War. This article concludes that, despite some unanticipated
consequences, the VA’s approach to Agent Orange has worked
well for establishing scientifically based and politically acceptable
compensation policies for Vietnam veterans. Efforts to apply this
approach to other groups of combat veterans with possible
environmental and occupational injuries and illnesses, however,
have not been successful.
I. PROVIDING DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR VETERANS
The VA is responsible for providing a wide range of federal
benefits, including healthcare, disability compensation, education
and vocational training, home loans, pensions, rehabilitation, and
survivor and burial benefits, to nearly 26 million American
veterans and their families.1 The provision of this wide range of
services has made the VA the second largest of all Cabinet-level
departments in terms of budget and staff. The VA’s fiscal year
2004 spending was $62.1 billion—$29.1 billion for healthcare and
$32.4 billion for benefits, including disability compensation.2 The
VA’s national healthcare system includes 158 hospitals, with at
least one in each of the forty-eight contiguous states, Puerto Rico,
and the District of Columbia. In fiscal year 2003, the VA provided
healthcare to about 4.8 million veterans, who made more than 49.8
million outpatient clinic visits.3
The VA’s disability compensation program provides monthly
monetary benefits to veterans who are disabled by serviceconnected injuries or diseases, that is, for illnesses or injuries that
were incurred or aggravated during their active military service.4
The amount of a monthly disability check is established by
Congress and is based on the degree of the service-connected
disability in 10% increments (10%, 20%, etc.), as determined by a
1

Office of Public Affairs Media Relations, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
Facts about the Department of Veterans Affairs (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.va.gov/OPA/fact/docs/vafacts.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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VA disability rating specialist.5 Currently, a veteran with a 10%
service-connected disability receives $108 per month, while a
veteran with a 100% service-connected disability receives $2,299
monthly.6 In fiscal year 2003, the VA spent $26 billion providing
disability compensation, death compensation, and pensions to
about 3.4 million veterans, and to nearly 600,000 spouses,
children, and parents of deceased veterans.7
A. Direct Service Connection and Disability Compensation
Establishing service connection and degree of disability usually
requires a simple review for a veteran with an acute disease or
injury, for example, a bullet or shrapnel wound.8 Most veterans
receiving disability compensation from the VA have injuries that
may be assessed through such a direct service connection
approach. Establishing direct service connection can be more
contentious, however, when the illness or injury involves a chronic
disease possibly caused by an environmental or occupational
exposure that may have occurred decades in the past (for example,
exposure to benzene as a potential cause of leukemia).
1. The Legal Standard
Congress has provided the VA with statutory guidance for
evaluating a direct disability compensation claim. Pursuant to
statute, the VA is authorized to pay disability compensation only
for a “disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease
contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military,

5

AND

U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS
DEPENDENTS 73 (2005), available at http://www.vetwatchnw.com/Fedben.

pdf.
6

Id. at 73.
Office of Public Affairs Media Relations, supra note 1.
8
Compensation and Pension Service, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
Disability Compensation Benefits (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.vba.
va.gov/bln/21/Milsvc/Docs/Compeg.doc.
7
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naval, or air service.”9
The required showing that a disease was incurred in service can
present significant difficulties in cases involving latent diseases
allegedly associated with exposures many years earlier. Courts
have held that claimants must establish a causal “nexus” between
their current diseases and some incident or exposure during
military service.10 The VA has, however, adopted a relatively
generous approach to resolving factual issues pertinent to this
inquiry. A VA regulation, 38 C.F.R. section 3.102, establishes
what is known as the “reasonable doubt” or “benefit of the doubt”
doctrine, which also has been referred to as the “tie goes to the
runner” rule based upon the baseball analogy. In relevant part, the
regulation provides:
It is the defined and consistently applied policy of the
Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under
a broad interpretation, consistent, however, with the facts
shown in every case. When, after careful consideration of
all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt
arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or
any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the
claimant. By reasonable doubt is meant one which exists
because of an approximate balance of positive and negative
evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove
the claim. . . . The reasonable doubt doctrine is also
applicable even in the absence of official records,
particularly if the basic incident allegedly arose under
combat, or similarly strenuous conditions, and is consistent

9

38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2005).
Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]n
order to establish service connection . . . the veteran must show: (1) the
existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a
disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and
the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.”); McCartt v. West,
12 Vet. App. 164, 168 (1999) (holding that, in the absence of an applicable
presumption of service connection, a claimant alleging disability due to Agent
Orange exposure had to submit “medical evidence of a nexus between Agent
Orange exposure and the appellant’s current [disease]”).
10
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with the probable results of such known hardships.11
In other words, the VA adjudicates a veteran’s direct service
disability compensation claim based upon the merits of the
individual case and grants a claim when the VA determines that a
veteran’s illness or injury is at least as likely as not to have been
caused by the environmental or occupational exposure.
2. Four Key Categories of Evidence for Direct Service Connection
As a practical matter, establishing a “nexus” between a
current disease and a claimed environmental or occupational
exposure in service generally requires four key categories of
evidence:
1. Evidence of a Scientific Association. Veterans must show
credible scientific or medical evidence that the exposure
involved is accepted as being associated with their specific
illness or injury;
2. Evidence of Military Exposure. Veterans must show
evidence that the relevant environmental or occupational
exposure occurred during their active military duty;
3. Evidence of Temporal Plausibility. Veterans must show
that their illnesses or injuries were initiated or were
exacerbated during active military duty; and
4. Evidence of Exposure Magnitude. Veterans must show
evidence of an unusually large or prolonged exposure to
support the conclusion that the exposure was at least as
likely as not to have been the specific cause of their
illnesses or injuries, in comparison to all other potential
causes of those illnesses experienced before and after
military service.
The “Evidence of Exposure Magnitude” requirement means
that a minimal, short-term, or commonplace exposure to an
environmental hazard might support the possibility that an illness
or injury was caused by the exposure; however, it might fail to
cross the statutory threshold requiring that it be at least as likely as
11

38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2005).
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not to have been the cause when compared to all other possible
causes. For example, a veteran who served two years in the
military and was diagnosed with leukemia at age fifty may have
had forty-eight years of exposure to benzene (a component of
gasoline) as a civilian outside of his military service and only two
years of exposure during service. Evidence that might support an
unusually large benzene exposure could include documentation
that the veteran’s military occupation, for example, regular motor
vehicle maintenance duties, specifically involved contact with
benzene.
In practice, this point can represent a significant hurdle for
establishing direct service connection for an illness or injury
caused by an environmental or occupational exposure. For
example, benzene is only a single and probably relatively minor
cause of all leukemias, and leukemia from all causes is not an
uncommon disease. Further, virtually everyone experiences
constant, minor benzene exposure because benzene is a component
of gasoline and other common solvents. Despite these restrictions,
most disability claims for environmental or occupational injury or
illness are based upon this direct service connection approach.
B. An Alternate Route to Disability Compensation:
Presumptive Service Connection
The VA has the authority to bypass one or even all of the four
key categories of evidence required for a direct service claim by
establishing a “presumptive” or automatic service connection. For
example, 38 C.F.R. section 3.307 and 38 C.F.R. section 3.309 list
some relatively common chronic diseases, including arthritis,
leukemia, and Type II diabetes, that the VA can presume to be
service connected when they appear within a certain period after
separation from military service, even if available evidence is not
sufficient to support a direct service connection. These
presumptively service connected illnesses must lead to at least
10% disability and appear generally within one year from the date
of the claimant’s separation from military service.12 Similarly, in
12

38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (2005); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (2005).
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1995, Congress authorized the VA’s compensation of veterans
with undiagnosed illnesses or with difficult to diagnose illnesses,
such as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable
bowel syndrome, that are defined by a cluster of signs or
symptoms.13 Under 38 U.S.C. section 1117, the VA is empowered
to provide compensation to Gulf War veterans who, for at least six
months, exhibit objective evidence of 10% or greater disability,
which may include disability due to fatigue, skin conditions,
headache, muscle and joint pain, sleep disturbances, abnormal
weight loss, menstrual disorders, and neurologic or
neuropsychological,
respiratory,
gastrointestinal,
and
14
cardiovascular illnesses. Approximately 3,200 veterans of the
1991 Gulf War have received compensation based upon this law.
These statutes give veterans the benefit of the doubt in cases in
which certain poorly understood illnesses manifest within a
defined period. Further, they effectively eliminate at least the
“Evidence of Temporal Plausibility” requirement of the direct
service connection test. Presumptive service connection for the
specified diseases is not, however, automatic, and the VA may
consider evidence in rebuttal of service connection, including “any
evidence of a nature usually accepted as competent to indicate the
time of existence or inception of disease . . . .”15 In fact, the VA’s
statutorily defined Agent Orange Vietnam Veteran compensation
policies, described in Part II of this article, have eliminated
essentially all four key categories. Not surprisingly, this has also
produced certain unexpected problems.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE VA’S PRESUMPTIVE SERVICE
CONNECTION FOR AGENT ORANGE
Vietnam veterans during the 1960s and 1970s voiced
increasing concerns about how exposure to herbicides and dioxin
had affected their health. Some veterans cited Agent Orange as the
source of various health problems that extended to birth defects
13
14
15

38 U.S.C. § 1117.
Id.
38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (2005); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (2005).
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among their children. Initially, the VA had problems establishing
policies on Agent Orange disability compensation. Minimal
veteran exposure information and limited scientific understanding
of Agent Orange and dioxin health effects meant that in the face of
mounting concerns from veterans and others, essentially all four
necessary categories of evidence for direct service connection were
missing.
In response, in 1991, Congress passed Public Law 102-4, more
commonly known as the “Agent Orange Act.” The Act mandated a
new process for establishing presumptive service connections for
illnesses related to Vietnam veterans’ exposure to Agent Orange,
other herbicides, and the contaminant dioxin, including a
presumption of exposure to those agents.16 The new law
represented a significant breakthrough for establishing
compensation policies in this area for what remains a controversial
issue even today.
The Agent Orange Act directed the VA to contract with the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a comprehensive
review of all scientific and medical literature on the health effects
from exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used in
Vietnam, and to dioxin. The initial 1994 NAS report—an
exhaustive and thorough review of all published literature on
health effects from exposure to these agents—established the
pattern for all future reports. Most of the reviewed literature came
from studies of civilians exposed either through industrial
accidents or in the workplace rather than from veterans themselves.
A. NAS Science and VA Policy
The Agent Orange Act assigns the NAS the responsibility of
evaluating the relevant science.17 The VA, in turn, is given
responsibility for translating the NAS’s scientific conclusions into
16

Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116).
17
38 U.S.C. § 1116 note (stating that the Act authorizes the National
Academy of Sciences “to review and evaluate the available scientific evidence
regarding associations between diseases and exposure to dioxin and other
chemical compounds in herbicides”).
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veteran compensation policy.18 In other words, the statute
expressly invites the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to consider
evidence in addition to that provided by the NAS. In practice, the
VA assembles an internal taskforce of scientists, medical doctors,
attorneys, and compensation experts to evaluate and recommend
possible policy options to the Secretary in response to an NAS
report.
The Act further provides for an automatic “Evidence of a
Scientific Association” for all Vietnam veterans, stating that “[a]n
association between the occurrence of a disease in humans and
exposure to an herbicide agent shall be considered to be positive
for the purposes of this section if the credible evidence for the
association is equal to or outweighs the credible evidence against
the association.”19 Based on the 1994 NAS report, the VA decided
to presumptively recognize a range of illnesses, including soft
tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease,
chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, multiple myeloma, and
respiratory cancers. The Agent Orange Act also requires the NAS
to update its reviews based on new science at least every two
years.20 Updated reviews, published in 1996, 1998, 2000, and
2002, have expanded the VA’s list of presumptively service18

38 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(1)-(2). In relevant part, the statute states:
Whenever the Secretary determines, on the basis of sound medical and
scientific evidence, that a positive association exists between (A) the
exposure of humans to an herbicide agent, and (B) the occurrence of a
disease in humans, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations providing
that a presumption of service connection is warranted for that disease
for the purposes of this section. In making determinations for the
purpose of this subsection, the Secretary shall take into account (A)
reports received by the Secretary from the National Academy of
Sciences under section 3 of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, and (B) all
other sound medical and scientific information and analyses available
to the Secretary. In evaluating any study for the purpose of making
such determinations, the Secretary shall take into consideration whether
the results are statistically significant, are capable of replication, and
withstand peer review.

Id.
19
20

38 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(3).
Id. § 1116 note.
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connected illnesses to include acute or sub-acute peripheral
neuropathy, Type II diabetes, prostate cancer, and most recently,
chronic lymphocytic leukemia. Based upon the 1996 NAS update
and congressional action, Vietnam veterans’ children with spina
bifida are also eligible for certain compensation and other
services.21
The Act also prescribes a “presumption of exposure” that
effectively frees a Vietnam veteran from having to show
“Evidence of Military Exposure,” “Evidence of Temporal
Plausibility,” and “Evidence of Exposure Magnitude,” the second,
third, and fourth key categories of evidence required for
establishing a direct service connection.22 As a result of this
statutorily defined policy, an eligible veteran (i.e., a veteran with
any discharge other than dishonorable discharge) must only show
that he is a Vietnam veteran diagnosed with one of the diseases
presumptively recognized as service connected to herbicide
exposure. Once this showing is made, service connection becomes
automatic.
This process eliminates a significant burden for Vietnam
veterans trying to establish service connection and disability
compensation for illnesses related to herbicide exposure. However,
there have been unexpected consequences in terms of apparent
inequities and unanticipated costs.

21

38 C.F.R. § 3.814 (2005).
38 U.S.C. § 1116. Specifically, the statute provides:
For purposes of establishing service connection for a disability or death
resulting from exposure to a herbicide agent, including a presumption
of service-connection under this section, a veteran who, during active
military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during
the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975,
shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service to an
herbicide agent containing dioxin or 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid,
and may be presumed to have been exposed during such service to any
other chemical compound in an herbicide agent, unless there is
affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to
any such agent during that service.
Id. § 1116(f) (2005).
22
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1. Credibility and Independence
The strengths of the NAS scientific review process are its
breadth and thoroughness, and the NAS’s reputation for
independence and scientific prestige. Earlier efforts by the VA to
conduct its own scientific reviews on herbicide health effects were
viewed by many veterans as lacking credibility and
independence.23 Although veterans have not always been happy
with the NAS findings, the NAS’s credibility has remained intact.
Indeed, the NAS process has become an essential step in ensuring
that new service connection presumptions command scientific
credibility.
2. Compensation Inequities
Without statutorily defined presumptions, Vietnam veterans
would have difficulty establishing a direct service connection for
any illnesses related to herbicide or dioxin exposure. In particular,
it would be difficult for claimants to provide “Evidence of a
Scientific Association,” “Evidence of Military Exposure,” and
“Evidence of Temporal Plausibility.” Epidemiological studies of
Vietnam veterans suggest that herbicide and dioxin exposure play,
probably at most, only a minute role in overall mortality.24 Taken
together, these studies suggest that Vietnam veterans would have
pronounced difficulty establishing “Evidence of Exposure
Magnitude,” that is, evidence that their exposures were sufficiently
23

U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON
HERBICIDES, INCLUDING PHENOXY HERBICIDES AND ASSOCIATED DIOXINS
(1981-1992) (vols. 1 & 2 prepared by JRB Associates, McLean, Va.; vols. 3 to
18 prepared by Clement Int’l, Fairfax, Va.; vols. 19 & 20 prepared by Info.
Ventures, Phila., Pa.).
24
Numerous epidemiological studies of Vietnam veterans in general do not
show that this group has higher mortality or morbidity from most of the diseases
presumptively connected to herbicide exposure. An excellent summary of
mortality and morbidity research on Vietnam veterans compared to their nondeployed peers is available in “Veterans and Agent Orange: A Continuing
Medical Education Program,” an independent study course first published in
2002 by the Department of Veterans Affairs, Employee Education System,
available at www.va.gov/VHI/.
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great or prolonged to make it at least as likely as not that the
exposures were the cause of the veterans’ illnesses or injuries when
compared to all other potential causes. A related problem is that
the Agent Orange Act has created a narrow focus on herbicides as
the key to Vietnam veterans’ illnesses when in fact they almost
certainly play only a very minor role.
Further, the Agent Orange Act applies only to Vietnam
veterans. Non-Vietnam veterans exposed to herbicides and dioxins
do not receive the benefit of presumptive service connections;
however, many non-Vietnam veterans have been exposed to these
agents, including U.S. troops serving during the Vietnam War but
only in nearby countries, including Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
or off-shore aboard ships. The U.S. military during 1968 and 1969
also used Agent Orange and similar herbicides to defoliate the
demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. The military
use of Agent Orange and related herbicides also was tested and
developed at U.S. bases located in the United States and abroad.
There is no obvious scientific or public health basis for
excluding these non-Vietnam War veterans from the presumptive
service connection offered to Vietnam veterans. Nevertheless, the
Agent Orange Act does not reference these veterans. To partially
address this apparent inequity, the VA has established the general
policy that when a non-Vietnam veteran is diagnosed with one of
the presumptively service-connected Agent Orange illnesses and
the veteran can provide evidence of exposure to Agent Orange,
then he can be granted service connection through a sort of
modified direct service connection route.
Even this approach may ultimately prove unmanageable
because, in fact, the majority of veterans could in principle claim
herbicide exposure during military service, and thus, service
connection for related illnesses. From the 1950s to the early 1970s,
Agent Orange and related herbicides, including those with dioxin
contaminants, were extensively used domestically for weed control
on lawns and golf courses (including those on military bases and
even VA hospitals), in forestry, and for weed control along fences,
borders, and roads. Thus, everyone living during that period likely
would have had some exposure.
Moreover, why should this policy be limited to military
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personnel? Many domestic civilian workers used these same
chemical agents. The VA has received inquiries about the VA’s
Agent Orange compensation policies from employees of the U.S.
Department of Interior who were involved in spraying these
herbicides on U.S. forests during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently asked the VA
why these same policies should not be applied to workers’
compensation claims filed with the U.S. Department of Labor.
Similarly, the Government of Vietnam has publicly insisted that
the U.S. government provide compensation to Vietnamese
civilians for Agent Orange-related injuries. (Thus far, the U.S.
government has denied this request.)
3. Cost Inequities
The economic implications of the Agent Orange Act may not
have been fully anticipated by Congress. In perhaps the most
dramatic and expensive example, the 2000 NAS Agent Orange
special report concluded that there was “limited/suggestive”
evidence associating herbicide exposure and Type II diabetes.25
(Previous NAS reports had not found such positive evidence, but
new scientific studies finally tipped the balance.) After reviewing
that finding, in 2001, the VA announced a new presumptive
service connection for Type II diabetes among Vietnam veterans.
This decision has significant economic implications. The VA
estimated that about 9%, or about 270,000 of the approximately 3
million Vietnam veterans, would have Type II diabetes based
solely upon on their age and other demographics. Diabetes often
involves prolonged disability, and treatment can be expensive. The
VA estimated that disability and treatment would cost several
billion dollars over the first five years of implementing this policy.
This is a significant portion of the VA’s overall disability
compensation budget for all veterans.
In fact, epidemiological studies do not show Vietnam veterans
25

INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, VETERANS AND
AGENT ORANGE: HERBICIDE/DIOXIN EXPOSURE AND TYPE 2 DIABETES 2 (2000)
(Nat’l Academy Press, Wash., D.C.).
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dying from Type II diabetes at greater rates than their nondeployed peers. This suggests that there are probably only a small
number of excess cases of Type II diabetes among Vietnam
veterans due to herbicide or dioxin exposure during military
service; indeed, the NAS noted that the biggest risk factors for
diabetes are lifestyle and obesity. Coupled with limited exposure
data, this means that few, if any, of these cases would have been
granted service connection via the direct service connection route.
In effect, the VA’s policy compensates a very large number of
veterans who would have been diagnosed with Type II diabetes
regardless of their military service in order to ensure coverage of
the few veterans who may have contracted the disease because of
it.
B. Applying the NAS Process to Gulf War Veterans
Despite these problems, the Agent Orange Act and the NAS
process it defined are generally acknowledged as successful
approaches to incorporating science into difficult and contentious
veteran compensation policy decisions. Nevertheless, more recent
attempts to apply the Agent Orange approach to emerging
environmental disabilities in veterans have suffered from the
unintended consequences associated with implementing the Agent
Orange Act for Vietnam veterans and thus far have produced little
or no benefit for veterans.
The 1991 Gulf War concluded fourteen years ago. In response
to the concerns of veterans and their families, and of Congress that
the health of Gulf War veterans might have been affected by
exposure to a wide variety of environmental hazards during the
war, Congress passed two statutes, Public Law 105-277 and Public
Law 105-368.26 These statutes were drawn directly from the Agent
Orange Act of 1991 and established the now-familiar formal NAS
process, which mandates regular and thorough reviews of the
scientific and medical literature relevant to health and Gulf War
26

Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1998); Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105368, 112 Stat. 3315 (1998).
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exposures.
Major differences in the environmental exposures experienced
by individuals serving during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars led to
immediate problems with this approach. In contrast to the narrow
range of exposures composed of “herbicides used in Vietnam and
their dioxin contaminant,” the exposures related to service in the
Gulf War involved dozens of different and unrelated
environmental hazards. In fact, the two new statutes specified
thirty-three Gulf War-related environmental and occupational
hazards as well as broad categories of hazards to be evaluated
through this process. Consequently, although the NAS has
produced three major biannual reports, it has yet to complete even
an initial review of all of the statutorily defined Gulf War
hazards.27
In addition, in 1991, there was only a limited amount of
scientific literature on health effects of dioxins and Vietnamrelated herbicides for the NAS to review. In contrast, virtually all
of the Gulf War hazards were well known and characterized, with
an abundant health effects literature. The NAS reviews have thus
failed to produce any new insights into the health effects of
exposure to these hazards, as the NAS’s findings have mirrored
those found in any standard occupational health and toxicology
textbook.
The first NAS report, completed in 2000, reviewed health
effects from exposure to sarin, depleted uranium, pyridostigmine
bromide, and certain vaccines, including the anthrax vaccine.28 The
second report, completed in 2003, reviewed the health effects of
exposure to all of the insecticides and solvents used in the 1991
27

INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND
HEALTH VOL. 1: DEPLETED URANIUM, PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, SARIN,
VACCINES (2000) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter GULF
WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 1] (on file with author); INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2: INSECTICIDES AND
SOLVENTS (2003) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter GULF
WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2] (on file with author); INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3: FUELS, COMBUSTION
PRODUCTS, AND PROPELLANTS (2004) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3] (on file with author).
28
GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 1, supra note 27, at 2.
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Gulf War.29 The third report, completed in 2004, reviewed the
health effects of exposure to oil well fire air pollutants and certain
other chemicals associated with the 1991 Gulf War.30
Taken together, these recent NAS reports contain dozens of
somewhat predictable findings on health effects for dozens of
hazardous agents. As with the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the new
statutes direct the VA to find a positive association between a Gulf
War hazard and a specific illness “if the credible evidence for the
association is equal to or outweighs the credible evidence against
the association,”31 or to provide to Congress a report including “the
Secretary’s recommendations as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a presumption of service-connection for the
occurrence of a specified condition in Gulf War veterans.”32 When
the evidence supports an association with a particular disease more
than it does not, the statute requires the VA to develop regulations
defining a presumptive service connection for that disease among
Gulf War veterans.33
C. Policy Problems
The VA has had difficulty applying the NAS findings to Gulf
War veterans because nearly all of the reviewed Gulf War-related
29

GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2, supra note 27, at 2.
GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3, supra note 27 (forthcoming
publication).
31
Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998 § 1602(b)(3), 112 Stat. 2681
(1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118).
32
Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998 § 101(i)(2), 112 Stat. 3315
(1998).
33
Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
1602(c)(1), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118) (“Not later than
60 days after the date on which the Secretary receives a report from the National
Academy of Sciences . . . the Secretary shall determine whether or not a
presumption of service connection is warranted for each illness, if any, covered
by the report.”); id. § 1602(c)(2) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118) (“If the
Secretary determines under this subsection that a presumption of service
connection is warranted, the Secretary shall, not later than 60 days after making
the determination, issue proposed regulations setting forth the Secretary’s
determination.”).
30
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hazards represent common, well-characterized occupational
exposures that are experienced by virtually all Americans. It may
come as a surprise to learn that military environmental exposures
generally closely mirror the environmental exposures experienced
by all Americans.
1. Considering Exposure Magnitude
The VA has had particular difficulty applying the NAS’s
conclusions based on studies of civilian workers with occupational
exposures to the experience of deployed Gulf War veterans.
Although essentially all health effects reported by the NAS are
based on studies of workers with occupational exposures typically
occurring over years, and indeed decades, deployments during the
1991 Gulf War typically lasted about only three months. For
example, in its 2002 report, the NAS documented a slight increase
in risk for leukemia among chemical industry workers who have
large occupational exposure to benzene. These findings do little to
inform us about the potential increased risk of leukemia in the
typical Gulf War soldier experiencing an unremarkable benzene
exposure during the few months of deployment.
On the other hand, there are certainly examples of Gulf War
veterans with greater than everyday or commonplace benzene
exposure, for example, veterans who regularly worked on vehicle
maintenance. Those cases could involve benzene exposure at
levels more comparable to the typical civilian occupational
exposures that formed the bases of the studies reviewed by the
NAS.
Similarly, many NAS findings on long-term health effects
among civilian workers are reported only in cases that involved an
unusual exposure sufficiently large to cause immediate and serious
health effects. For example, certain long-term health effects from
common organophosphorus pesticides are well documented, but
only as the result of an exposure large enough to cause severe and
immediate initial poisoning, typically, an occupational exposure.
Exposures that do not cause immediate and serious effects have not
been associated with long-term effects. How should the VA apply
these NAS findings to the vast majority of veterans who
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experienced only unexceptional exposures to these agents? In fact,
all Americans have experienced some small, but more or less
continuous exposure to common organophosphorus pesticides or to
benzene during their lifetimes. Still, these exposures are considered
to have negligible health risk significance, given the small
magnitude of the exposure.
The problem for the VA is that the underlying statutes
outlining this process eliminate the requirement for any “Evidence
of Exposure Magnitude” that would be necessary for a direct
service connection and offer little or no guidance for making
distinctions based on exposure magnitude or duration. In effect,
this creates the somewhat scientifically implausible result of
treating all exposures as equally likely to lead to an associated
long-term health effect. As a result, the VA could presumptively
service connect all of the illnesses positively associated by the
NAS with all of the associated Gulf War risk factors identified by
the NAS, no matter how universal or trivial the exposure
magnitude may have been for most or even all Gulf War veterans.
For these reasons, the VA has thus far been unable to develop
any new presumptive service connected disabilities for the wide
range of hazardous occupational and environmental exposures
associated with the 1991 Gulf War. Some of the NAS findings are
still under review.
2. Are New Presumptive Service Connection Polices Necessary?
Any presumptive service connection compensation policy will
bring certain negative consequences. Policymakers presumably
have determined that the advantages outweigh the drawbacks. In
this instance, it is not clear that new presumptive service
connections are necessary to provide equitable compensation to
Gulf War veterans for the environmental and occupational injuries
they sustained during their service.
Both short- and long-term health effects from most Gulf War
hazardous exposures were generally very well characterized, even
before that war began. That information, which is summarized in
the NAS reviews, provides Gulf War veterans with a strong basis
for pursuing disability compensation through the conventional
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direct service connection route. The NAS reviews provide Gulf
War veterans with ready access to scientific information to support
the “Evidence of a Scientific Association” criterion. A Gulf War
veteran would still be required to show “Evidence of Military
Exposure” and “Evidence of Temporal Plausibility” to support a
direct service connection claim. However, today many
environmental hazards have been inexorably linked with service in
the 1991 Gulf War.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle for establishing a direct service
connection would be providing “Evidence of Exposure
Magnitude” that demonstrates that the veteran’s exposure was at
least as likely as not to have been the cause of her disability.
However, that is a commonplace and hardly insurmountable
obstacle for veteran compensation claims in general. For example,
in cases in which the NAS had documented long-term health
effects marked by immediate and serious health effects at the time
of exposure, a veteran’s military record or other lay evidence
would likely be sufficient to support the veteran’s claim. Indeed,
veterans might even prevail in cancer claims based on initial
exposures that did not involve immediate and obvious effects by
demonstrating, through the presentation of their specific military
occupation and service records, that they experienced long-term
moderate to high-level exposures that are generally associated with
cancer in the relevant occupational health literature and that these
exposures were “at least as likely as not” the cause of their cancer.
Thus, the direct service connection route could cover most
disability claims for illnesses that the NAS found to be associated
with Gulf War environmental and occupational exposures. More
simply, the conventional direct service connection process, based
on a review of the identity of the exposure and information about
its magnitude, would be sufficient to establish service connection
when warranted.
CONCLUSION
The majority of veteran disability compensation claims for
injuries related to environmental or occupational exposures are
evaluated on the merits of the individual case through the direct
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service connection process. New presumptive service connection
policies inevitably bring unintended consequences, including a
perceived or actual disparity in access to disability benefits for
different groups of veterans, unanticipated costs, and scientifically
implausible or untenable policies.
Presumptive service connection policies may be useful for
specific situations in which it is impractical for veterans to develop
a direct service claim, for example, when a veteran is diagnosed
with an illness of unclear or unknown cause within a short period
following separation from military service. Nevertheless, before
considering new presumptive service connections that offer certain
veterans special presumptive service connection, the VA and
congressional policymakers should first determine that the
conventional direct service connection route is not adequate to the
task.
When a new presumptive service connection policy is
determined to be necessary, it should be implemented in a manner
that is considered fair and consistent with available science. In
virtually all cases this requires the use of an independent scientific
review body, such as the NAS, to ensure the credibility of the new
policy and the perception by all parties that the policy is
impartially based upon the best science.
Experience has shown that presumptive service connection
policies that eliminate consideration of the magnitude of exposure
should be avoided because they run the likely risk of inadvertently
extending eligibility to all veterans, regardless of how trivial or
commonplace their exposures may have been. Some of these issues
may require clarification by Congress in the form of legislative
fixes for those portions of statutes that have led to unanticipated
problems.

